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ABSTRACT 
The contrast between organic and mechanic arose as part of the reactions against the 
French Revolution and the Industrial Revolution. It ran throughout the 19th, it fuelled 
“Romantic” reactions to Newtonian science and the antithesis between Kultur and 
Zivilisation. This contrast is still evident, to a greater or lesser extent, in  many of the 
present criticisms of  industrial society and technology. There is an interesting continuity 
between the arguments used by the early critics of what Carlyle would call the «age of 
machines» and some of the arguments and ways of thinking that are current today. The 
paper is devoted to stress this continuity by considering some representative authors, 
including Burke, Blake, Coleridge, Wordsworth, Carlyle, Ruskin, Sombart, Spengler, 
Scheler, T. Mann. Their interactions with political and social thought are also discussed. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Technology is perhaps the most evident aspect of present-day life. However, 
or because of this, it is under concentric attack from many sides: 
philosophers denouncing its de-humanizing effects, economists urging that 
we should rethink our notion of development and take a step back, ‘green’ 
scientists searching for ‘clean’ energy sources, critics of the Western way of 
life (and defenders of native cultures of America, Africa or Asia), opponents 
of capitalist industrialism, environmentalists fighting against pollution and 
unrestrained exploitation of nature, humanists wishing a return to more 
humane values, utopian thinkers, nostalgic admirers of rural life, Arcadists, 
catastrophists... These diverse, and differently motivated,criticisms, 
irrespective of whether they are right or wrong (this does not concern us 
                                                 
* This essay is dedicated to Paolo Rossi, in memoriam, who taught that intellectuals 
should pay attention to the works of the hands as well as those of the head, to machines 
as well as philosophies; for technology is thinking, and as ambiguous, fascinating and 
challenging as the world of ideas. 
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here), may reveal, on closer scrutiny, an underlying tendency to involve a 
large part of Western modernity as it  emergedduring the Industrial 
Revolution of the late  18th and early 19th centuries. Nothing new under the 
sun: technology-based industry and its consequences on human life, have 
provoked opposition from the beginning. To be sure, the language in which 
criticisms have been raised since then has varied, and new arguments have 
been added, especially since sensitivity to environmental issues has become a 
major concern for many educated people. However, a historian of ideas 
cannot but be impressed by continuities as well as by discontinuities. This is 
all the more true if discourses on technology are examined in connection with 
political attitudes. Early reactions to the Industrial Revolution and the 
coming of ‘machinery’ on a large scale were often all of a piece with reactions 
to another epoch-making event, the French Revolution. Modern science, too, 
has usually been included among the defendants: as Paolo Rossi (1989) 
remarked, Galileo has been repeatedly brought to court during the 19th 
century.  
Words, the images they convey and the unconscious suggestions they 
drag along with them, can be revealing. Early critics of the two revolutions 
frequently used words such as ‘mechanism’ and ‘mechanical’ in a 
depreciatory sense, to refer to the new order of things, to which they opposed 
views of  society they portrayed as ‘living’, ‘vital’ or ‘organic’. It is worth 
inquiring whether and, if so, to what extent this imagery has left traces in 
subsequent intellectual life in Europe. There are hints it has. After all, one of 
the most eloquent critics of industrialism and technology in today’s 
globalized world, Serge Latouche, describes this world as the 
“Megamachine”.           
This paper does not dare to narrate the whole story. Nor does it claim to 
be particularly original. It merely aims to highlight some of the uses that 
were made of ‘organic’, ‘mechanical’ and related words and concepts by 
critics of modernity in the 19th and early 20th centuries. It also brings 
together useful materials for a broader studyof the intersections between 
attitudes towards nature, values, society, politics, science and technology (all 
of them taken in a large sense), which I hope to pursue in the future. This 
paper is therefore a step towards a discussion of issues that are still topical 
today. I am convinced that history–indeed, dear old history of ideas–has 
much to contribute to present debates. By showing continuities as well as 
discontinuities, recurrences as well as transformations, this paper puts these 
debates in perspective, unmasking undeclared assumptions lying behind 
competing opinions, as well as their unnoticed implications.   
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2. Against Newton 
 
As is well known, a general reaction against the Enlightenment took place 
towards the end of the 18th century, and was a major component of the 
Romantic1 atmosphere, especially in Germany. German Naturphilosophie 
was characterised by a revival of anti-empiricism, anti-mechanism, anti-
utilitarianism, and,  above all, anti-materialism. ‘Living’, ‘organic’, 
‘animated’ became flags signalling good philosophy and science. Such an 
influential philosopher as Schelling not only gave the ‘organism’ 
methodological and metaphysical priority over ‘mechanism’, but he also 
interpreted the universe as an integrated and functional living whole, 
‘animated’ by conflicting polar forces and Potenzen (Poggi 2000, Pinkard 
2008).  
Anti-Newtonianism was a major component of much of 
Naturphilosophie. It was shared even by authors that could hardly be 
labelled as romantic. Hegel rejected not only Newton’s idea of absolute 
space, his theory of light and (partly) his astronomical system, but also what 
he considered Newton’s tendency to reduce thinking to calculation and to 
confuse mathematical abstractions with physical forces and philosophical 
concepts. Hegel used the word ‘organism’ to refer to geological as well as 
biological wholes, and he did not refrain from drawing daring, Renaissance-
style rather than Romantic, analogies between them.2   
Goethe did not content himself with attacking Newton’s theory of light 
on the grounds that it ignored the active role played by the percipient 
subject. He went so far as to say that “attempting to get to know nature 
merely through artifices and instruments” was “the greatest disaster in 
modern physics”. He called Newton’s physics “the pathology of 
experimental physics”, and he hoped “to liberate the phenomena once and 
for all from the gloom of the empirico-mechanico-dogmatic torture 
chamber”.3 
                                                 
1 I will use this term throughout in an avowedly generic way, for want of a better one.  
2 For instance: “Just as springs are the lungs and secretory glands for the Earth’s process 
of evaporation, so are volcanoes the Earth’s liver, in that they represent the Earth’s 
spontaneous generation of heat within itself” (Enzyklopädie der philosophischen 
Wissenschaften, § 341, Zusatz. In 1851, Gustav Theodor Fechner counted some fifty 
analogies between the organic body and the Earth (Fechner 1851, p. 1). As late as 1922 
the historian Ernst Troeltsch discussed the doctrines on history and society of Schelling, 
Savigny, Adam Müller, Otto von Gierke and other philosophers, historians, jurists and 
political thinkers under the heading ‘The Organologie der deutschen Schule’ (Troeltsch 
1922, pp. 277-313).  
3 Quoted by Heller 1961, p. 20. According to Heller, Goethe showed “the potential hubris” 
inherent in the pursuits of  modern science (p. 7). This may not be entirely accurate as 
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3. “Dark Satanic mills” 
 
Newton was criticised in Britain, too. To William Blake’s mind he formed 
with Bacon and Locke a sort of counter-Trinity responsible for mortifying 
imagination and ossifying the spiritual in man. Philosophy had been 
delivered into the hands of Locke and Newton by Urizen, Blake’s Satan-like  
“Lord of the intellect” and abstract reason, the spirit of negation and 
separation.4 A “lame philosophy”5 restricted man to his ratiocinating self, as 
in a prison, depriving him of full vision, as in sleep: “May God us keep/ From 
single vision & Newton’s sleep”.6 Rescue would come from imagination and 
poetry: the eye, as opposed to the intellect, is the organ through which man 
can see his organic connection with the universe (“We are led to Believe a 
Lie/ When we see not through the Eye”).7 Newtonianism “petrifies all the 
Human Imagination into rock & sand”, and “mathematical proportion” is 
the negation of “living proportion”. 
“… Cruel Works 
Of many Wheels I view, Wheel without Wheel with cogs tyrannic 
Moving by compulsion each other: not as those in Eden: which 
Wheel after Wheel in freedom revolve in harmony & peace.”8  
“Satanic wheels” in the heavens, “dark Satanic mills” on the earth. For 
the mechanical philosophy of Locke and Newton has materialized in 
industry, which is transforming soul and life into furnaces and machines, as 
Urizen’s sons transformed the “arts of life” into the “arts of death”.9 And 
man, with his reason, is severed from the source of his and all living energy, 
and is now an “unorganised” particle in a mechanical universe. 
 
 
                                                                                                                                                        
regards Goethe’s own attitude, but it captures the spirit of many  20th century opponents 
of ‘quantitative’ (Galilean, Newtonian) science, then and in more recent times. 
4 “Till a philosophy of Five Senses was complete/ Urizen wept & gave it into the hand of 
Newton & Locke” (Africa, lines 16-17, in Blake 1965, p. 66). Urizen is opposed by Los, 
spirit of poetry, prophecy and creation: “… I will not reason/ nor compare: my duty is to 
create”, he says in Jerusalem.  
5 Auguries of Innocence, line 106, ibid., p. 483. 
6 Letter of November 22, 1802, in Blake 1980, p. 46. Cf. “But Urizen laid in a stony sleep/ 
Unorganiz’ed, rent from Eternity” (The Book of Urizen (1794), Chapter III, in Blake 1965, 
p. 73). 
7 Ibid., lines 485-486. 
8 Europe, in Blake 1965, p. 314; Jerusalem, Chapter I, lines 17-20, ibid., p. 157. 
9 Jerusalem, Chapter I, line 37; Chapter III, line 16; Milton, Preface (ibid., pp. 156, 214). 
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4. “Communion with the spirit of nature” 
 
Samuel Coleridge, a disciple of Schelling’s, is a blatant instance of the fact 
that hostility to Newtonian science could be all of a piece with the rejection 
of materialism, atheism, hedonism, natural rights and the new commercial 
spirit: in a word, of the world issued from the Enlightenment and the French 
Revolution. He pleaded for a “metaphysics of quality” that would dispel the 
“philosophy of death”, that is the “mechanic philosophy” which had 
“infected  the modern mind”10 and reduced everything to “a mere 
juxtaposition of corpuscles”.11 Nature is not “an immense heap of little 
things”;12 it is a living being, and man’s spirit “has the same ground with 
nature”.13 But modern man is out of tune with nature: “we have purchased a 
few brilliant inventions at the loss of all communion with the spirit of 
nature”. The good old world, instead, was living and organic, as it was 
pervaded by spiritual value and sanctioned by God. It was also hierarchical: 
everything and everyone had their place in it. And now? We are witnessing 
the “neutralization of nature”, “the translation of a living world into a dead 
language” by abstract thinking. The faculty of the understanding, “which 
concerns itself exclusively with the quantities, qualities, and relations of 
particulars in time and space”, subsumes phenomena under “distinct kinds 
and sorts”, analyses and classifies them into abstract forms. As a 
consequence, “we think of ourselves as separated beings, and place nature in 
antithesis to the mind, as objects to subject, thing to thought, death to 
life”.14 The understanding is raised above the faculty of reason, which is “the 
science of the universal, having the ideas of oneness and allness as its two 
elements or primary factors”, “the power by which we become possessed of 
principles”, “the knowledge of the laws as a whole considered as one”. 
Imagination is expelled from poetry; God has been expelled from creation by 
Descartes and Locke; religion and the sense of mystery are marginalised; 
workers are “mechanized into engines for the manufactory of new rich men” 
who treat “the remainder of population” as “lifeless engines”;15 “social and 
hereditary privileges” are replaced by “a system of natural rights” ”, and 
“the wealth of nations [is] substituted for the well-being of nations and of 
man”.16 In addition to that: “The mechanico-corpuscular theory raised to the 
                                                 
10 The Statesman’s Manual, quoted in Willey 1980, p.28. 
11 The Friend, also quoted in Willey 1980, p. 20. 
12 Letter of 14 Oct. 1797, Collected Letters, I, 349. 
13 Coleridge 1907, II, p. 258. 
14 The Friend, Essay XI, in Complete Works, II, p. 469. 
15 Regrets and Apprehensions, in Complete Works, VI, p. 64; cf. Notebooks, II, 2557. 
16 The Friend, quoted in Willey 1980, p. 28. 
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title of the mechanical philosophy, and espoused as a revolution in 
philosophy by the actors and partisans of the (so-called) Revolution in the 
State […] A state of nature, or the Ourang Outang theology of the origin of 
the human race, substituted for the first ten chapters of the Book of Genesis; 
rights of nature for the duties and privileges of citizens; idealess facts, 
misnamed proofs from history, grounds of experience, and thelike, for 
principles and the insight derived from them […] The true historical feeling, 
the immortal life of the nation, generation linked to generation by faith, 
freedom, heraldry, and ancestral fame, languishing and giving place to to the 
superstition of wealth and newspaper reputation”.17  
 
 
5. Work in the “Mechanical Age” 
 
In a famous essay on Signs of the Times (1829), another critic of early 
industrialism, Thomas Carlyle, contrasted the old way of life with what he 
called “the Age of Machinery” or “Mechanical Age”. Society had been 
separated from life. Factory work removed man from the all-important 
contact with nature. “It is the Age of Machinery, in every outward and 
inward sense of that word; the age which, with its whole individual might, 
forwards, teaches and practices the great art of adapting means to ends. 
Nothing is done directly, or by hand; all is by rule and calculated 
contrivance”. To be sure, “we war with rude Nature; and, by our resistless 
engines, come off always victorious, and loaded with spoils”,18 but “the 
mechanical genius of our time” pervades all aspects of our lives: “Men are 
grown mechanical in head and heart, as well as in hand. They have lost faith 
in individual endeavour, and in natural force, of any kind. Not for internal 
perfection, but for external combinations and arrangements, for institutions, 
constitution - for mechanism of one sort or another, do they hope and 
struggle. Their whole efforts, attachments, opinions, turn in mechanism, and 
are of a mechanical character.”19  
As a result, “the mysterious springs of Love, and Fear, and Wonder, of 
Enthusiasm, Poetry, Religion, all which have a truly vital and infinite 
character” have been removed to the background. The arts and sciences are 
now pursued in institutions, laboratories and schools, but they were formed 
“by spontaneous growth, in the free soil and sunshine of Nature”, by the 
inner dynamics of man’s spirit, not mechanics.20 “This faith in Mechanism, in 
                                                 
17 The Constitution of Church and State (1829), in Complete Works, VI, pp. 64-65. 
18 Signs of the Times, ed. by Shilling (in Carlyle 1888), p. 233.  
19 Ibid., p. 236.  
20 Ibid., p. 241. 
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the all-importance of physical things, is in every age the common refuge of 
Weakness and blind Discontent; of all who believe, as many will ever do, 
that man’s true good lies without him, not within […] This deep paralysed 
subjection to physical objects come not from Nature, but from our own 
unwise mode of viewing Nature.”21   
“Motive-grinders, and Mechanical Profit-and-loss Philosophers” have 
brought on “sick ophthalmia and hallucination”.22 We construe society as “a 
machine”, in which “cash-payment” is “the sole nexus of man with man”. 
Laissez faire is the social and economic expression of the mechanical 
philosophy. It generates chaos, by destroying the “vital essence” of society 
and atomizing social relations, i.e. by insulating the individuals from each 
other and from themselves. It is a “social gangrene” and a “gospel of 
despair”.23 However, true society is necessarilyorganic; it is a tissue of  
“organic filaments” linking men, and generations, with one another.24 The 
present system cannot last, for it is against nature. We can therefore “glance 
timidly into the immense Industrial Ages”, which are “as yet all inorganic, 
and in a quite pulpy condition, requiring desperately to harden themselves 
into some organism”,25 and be confident that an industrial and “organic” 
society will come out of the chaos of competition. Safety lies in work: for him 
that will continue to work, and thereby learn “Laws, Obligations sacred as 
Man’s life itself” and “far deeper than Supply-and-demand”, “behold, 
Nature is on his side”, and he shall “prosper with noble rewards”.26  There is 
room for optimism: “Gradually, assaulted from beneath and from above, the 
Stygian mud-deluge of Laissez-faire, Supply-and-demand, Cash-payment the 
one Duty, will abate on all hands; and the everlasting mountain-tops, and 
secure rock-foundations that reach to the centre of the world, and rest on 
nature’s self, will again emerge, to found on, and to build on. When 
mammon-worshippers hare and there begin to be God-worshippers, and 
bipeds-of-prey become men, and there is a Soul felt once more in the huge-
pulsing elephantine mechanic Animalism of this Earth, it will be again a 
blessed Earth.”27  
 
                                                 
21 Ibid., pp. 250-251. 
22 Sartor Resartus (1831), ed. by Shilling (in Carlyle 1888), Book II, Chapter VII, p. 113. 
23 Past and Present (1843), ed. Shilling (in Carlyle 1888), Book III, Chapt. II, p. 126; X, 
pp. 161, 167. 
24 Sartor Resartus, cit., Book III, Chapt. VII, pp. 170, 193-197. 
25 Past and Present, cit., Book IV, Chapt. I, p. 214. 
26 Ibid., Book III, Chapt. IX, p. 160. 
27 Ibid., Book IV, Chapt. VIII, p. 252. 
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Work plays a paramount role in Carlyle’s rethinking of modernity and 
hopes for the future. He waxes lyrical in his celebration of it. Work is a 
spiritual energy that pervades the universe. Through it, the heart of man is 
intimately connected with the heart of the whole, and can be reintegrated in 
the life of nature. Workis “the voice of God”, which has not remained silent 
even in the last two “atheistic centuries”. It is the hard way to salvation, a 
duty and a sacrifice to universal order. Only he who works can see light and 
radiate it. But this exacts the re-awakening of the self by a descent into the 
“inner man”, in search of the soul: “Thou must descend to the Mothers, to 
the Manes, and Hercules-like long suffer and labour there, wouldst thou 
emerge with victory into the sunlight”. In short, “work is worship”.28 A 
gigantic struggle waged by each individual will enable mankind to go beyond 
mundane limitations and to ascend to the sky, triumphing over the 
apocalypse of chaos, division, decay and conflict.     
By making work the pivot of a heroic, Promethean perspective, Carlyle 
reconciles himself with the industrial age: it is impossible to return to the 
organic world of heretofore, where men did not act out of their interest but 
on the spur of unconscious drives, artistic intuitions and internalised duties. 
Carlyle, too, regrets the Middle Ages, when everything and everyone had 
their assigned place in a spiritual cosmos.  However, he believes it possible to 
redeem the industrial society from its evils (individualism, greed, the law of 
the strongest, laissez faire, disorganisation) through a moral transfiguration 
of capitalism. He then feels entitled to teach workers to listen to nature’s and 
God’s command, and to submit to it, by forming a sort of militant 
organisation of labour forces towards an ideal mission. The reward for such 
subordination will be individual and social salvation. For men are not saved 
by laws, elections, reforms or, worse, social agitations, unless the social order 
is pervaded by a religious spirit. It is through work that the sacred order will 
be instaured on the earth, and that man will reach the Promised Land. 
Carlyle prophesies a spiritual, not a material regeneration. Its alternative is 
simply death: “There will a radical universal alteration of your regimen and 
life take place; there will a most agonising divorce between you and your 
chimeras, luxuries and falsities take place; a most toilsome, all-but 
impossible ‘return to nature’, and her veracities and her integrities, take 
place; that so the inner fountains of life may again begin, like eternal Light-
fountains, to irradiate and purify your bloated, swollen, foul existence, 
drawing nigh, as at present to nameless death! Either death, or else all this 
will take place.”29  
 
                                                 
28 Ibid., pp. 22, 172, 176, 200). 
29 Ibid., pp. 20-21. 
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6. The workman as “a component of a mechanical system”  
 
Carlyle’s fight to re-spiritualise the world of machines was, in his eyes, all the 
more necessary because others were attempting to do quite the opposite. 
Josiah Wedgwood, of pottery fame, attempted to organise his factory so as 
to “make such machines of the men as cannot err”.30 And the British chemist 
and industrialist Andrew Ure (1778-1857) wrote in his Philosophy of 
manufactures (1835) that it is the workers that must adapt themselves to the 
machine, and become “organs of a vast automaton”: “The term Factory, in 
technology, designates the combined operation of many orders of work-
people, adult and young, in tending with assiduous skill a system of 
productive machines continuously impelled by a central power […] I 
conceive that this title, in its strictest sense, involves the idea of a vast 
automaton, composed of various mechanical and intellectual organs, acting 
in uninterrupted concert for the production of a common object, all of them 
being subordinated to a self-regulated moving force.” 
The mill-owner should therefore “organize his moral machinery on 
equally sound principles with his mechanical”. These principles boil down to 
one: regularity. It must replace muscular work, “which is by its nature fitful 
and capricious”, and generates “desultory habits of work” (Ure 1835, pp. 13-
15). This cannot even be achieved by a “mechanical genius” alone: “It 
required, in fact, a man of a Napoleon nerve and ambition, to subdue the 
refractory tempers of work-people accustomed to irregular paroxysms of 
diligence” (ibid., p. 16). Personal craftsmanship can dangerous. The solution 
is a mechanical, self-regulating system: “[…] whenever a process requires 
peculiar dexterity and steadiness of hand, it is withdrawn as soon as possible 
from the cunning workman, who is prone to irregularities of many kinds, and 
it is placed in charge of a peculiar mechanism, so self-regulating, that a child 
may superintend it […]. The principle of the factory system then is, to 
substitute mechanical science for hand skill, and the partition of a process 
into its essential constituents, for the division or graduation of labour among 
artisans” (ibid., pp. 19-20).  
It is almost impossible to “convert” people that have passed the age of 
puberty “into useful factory hands”, for they have contracted peasants’ or 
craftsmen’ habits, and human nature is, unfortunately, what it is. This is 
why the mill-owner is strongly recommended to replace, whenever possible, 
specialized and costly human components with more ordinary, pliable and 
reliable ones. “By the infirmity of human nature it happens, that the more 
                                                 
30 Quoted in Thompson 1964, p. 351. 
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skilful the workman, the more self-willed and intractable he is apt to become, 
and, of course, the less fit a component of a mechanical system, in which, by 
occasional irregularities, he may do great damages to the whole. The grand 
object therefore of the modern manufacturer is, through the union of capital 
and science, to reduce the task of his work-people to the exercise of vigilance 
and dexterity,--faculties, when concentred to one process, speedily brought 
to perfection in the young […] It is, in fact, the constant aim and tendency 
of every improvement in machinery to supersede human labour altogether, 
or to diminish its cost, by substituting the industry of women and children 
for that of men; or that of ordinary labourers, for trained artisans.” (ibid., 
pp. 20-21, 23) 
 
 
6. Polluting machinery 
 
John Ruskin did not share Carlyle’s worship of work as such. According to 
Ruskin, work, must not be a struggle against misery or for the subjugation of 
nature, nor a compulsive activity spurred by an acquisitive spirit; it must be 
a free creation, a joyful expression of the whole personality in a suitable 
natural and social environment. Ruskin put art far higher than labour, and 
his opposition to the industrial world was based on aesthetic as well as 
ethical reasons. But he, too, was inspired by the romantic belief in a 
fundamental affinity between nature and spirit. The same harmony that 
reigns in nature must reign in man, and its human manifestation is in art. 
Art must imitate nature, Ruskin says, but what he means by nature is a far 
cry from any “Newtonian machine” ruled by mathematical laws. It is, 
instead, an all-pervasive vital energy producing a mysterious harmony, 
which can be captured by the imagination, for the intellect is able to grasp 
logical and mechanical relations only. Nature is a web of infinite and 
indeterminate correspondences, a vivid representation of which is conveyed 
by the “mist effect” in Turner’s pictures. 
Creative energies can produce art only in fully developed beings living in 
a healthy environment. Bad social conditions pervert the divinity of man,31 
and no art is possible where nature is destroyed, waste produced, social 
injustice legalised and the lowest passions encouraged. Unfortunately, such is 
the case in modern society, which is not a community of cooperating and 
interdependent individuals bound to each other by the “law of help”, but a 
state of anarchy where men are driven only by “the great mechanical 
                                                 
31 During the 1850s, man replaced nature in Ruskin’s thought as the highest 
manifestation of the divine. This change was probably due to his progressive dislike for 
the mortification of man he found in the Gospels. 
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impulses of the age”.32 “A pure and holy state of anything […] is that in 
which all its parts are helpful or consistent. They may or may not be 
homogeneous. The highest or organic purities are composed of many 
elements in an entirely helpful state. The highest and first law of the 
universe – and the other name of life is […] ‘help’. The other name of death 
is ‘separation’. Government and cooperation are in all things and eternally 
the laws of life. Anarchy and competition, eternally, and in all things, the 
laws of death.”33 
Laissez faire is the social and economic manifestation of the mechanical 
impulses that atomize social relations, spoil beauty, and pervert vitality by 
nourishing the foolish desire to “kill space and time”, to do ever more and 
more hastily. Machines make automata of workmen.34 Cities have become 
places “in which the object of men is not life, but labour; […] in which 
existence becomes mere transition, and every creature is only one atom in a 
drift of human dust, and current of interchangeable particles circulating here 
by tunnels, and here by tubes in the air”.35 “Mechanism” (which in Ruskin’s 
mind embraces modern science36 and the belief in progress, rationalism and 
utilitarianism in philosophy and associationism in psychology, as well as 
industrialism, urbanization, overcrowding and pollution) is the result of a 
metaphysical perversion: man’s arrogant severance of himself from the rest 
of the world, both animate and inanimate, and from the vital energy of love 
that pervades all things and makes it possible for them to communicate with 
one another. “Gambling and stealing” are the main activities of the 
Mammon-worshipping merchant.37 Ruskin traces the origin of the 
“acquisitive spirit” and the ethics of “getting on” back to Protestantism 
(significantly, an enemy of art);  he does not shrink from describing the 
“honest but not liberally minded Protestant” as more hypocritical than the 
                                                 
32 Modern Painters, vol. 3, in Works, V, p. 380. 
33 Ibid., vol. 4, in Works, VII, p. 207. 
34 According to Ruskin, machines can be useful only in rural life. He does not believe that 
mechanization is irreversible.  
35 The Study of Architecture (1865) Works, 19, p. 24. Carlyle defined London as “that 
monstrous tuberosity of civilized life” (Sartor Resartus, cit., Book III, Chapter VI, p. 167). 
36 Science tends to stifle man’s natural desire for contemplation, to chill and subdue 
sentiments, and to reduce all things to “atoms and numbers”. It is to be doubted whether 
an optician, however religious, enjoys the view of the rainbow more than an ignorant 
peasant does (Modern Painters, vol. III, in Works, 5, pp. 386-387). To Ruskin the true 
science of economy is something quite different from “the bastard science” that goes 
under this name: it is the science that teaches to work for the things “that lead to life”, 
not for those that lead to destruction (Unto This Last, 1860, in Works, 17, p. 85). It will be 
remembered that Carlyle called economics “the dismal science”. 
37 A Joy Forever (The Political Economy of Art), 1857, in Works, 16, p. 138) 
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Roman Catholic, nor from defining the Protestant capitalist “a little 
porker”.38  
One of the most visible consequences of the mechanical mentality is 
pollution, moral and physical, which Ruskin denounces indignantly, with 
plenty of details, and with his anger at injured innocence often taking on 
apocalyptic tones (Fitch 1982). Industry does not produce wealth, but “illth” 
(Ruskin’s coinage). It has destroyed the landscape, poisoned air, water and 
earth, and turned every river of England into a sewage: English babies are 
now being christened with “filth”.39 According to Ruskin, polluting means, 
literally, desecrating and profaning.   
Ruskin’s ideal is the “organic” society consisting of small rural 
communities based on the family and on parental relations, like in Ancient 
Greece and the Middle Ages. Like Coleridge and Carlyle, Ruskin would 
welcome the intervention of the State to restore organic society. This appears 
to be a strange contradiction in authors who rejected Enlightenment 
rationalism and ‘utilitarianism’ on the grounds that they favoured 
“artificial” planning and social engineering disruptive of traditional ‘organic’ 
society. There is also a contradiction between these authors’ celebration of 
spontaneous growth, creative freedom and unrestrained vitality on the one 
hand, and their rejection of laissez faire and so much of modernity as 
“unnatural” on the other hand; it almost seems as if what they described as 
the present social chaos were not as spontaneously generated as the organic 
order of the Middle Ages!  It has been pointed out that there is an 
“unresolved conflict within [Ruskin’s] thought and within the Romantic 
movement between a dynamic organicism of free energy and a static 
organicism of surface form and order”.40    
                                                 
38 Protestantism: the Pleasure of Truth (1884) in Works, 33, p. 509. 
39 Fors Clavigera. Letters to the Workmen and Labourers of Great Britain (1871-1884), in 
Works, 27, p. 92. 
40 Sherburne 1972, p. 84. A similar point was made by Basil Willey  (1986, esp. Chapt. XI) 
with respect to the uses of  ‘nature’ by some representative thinkers of the  18th and early 
19th centuries. Both reformers and conservatives appealed to nature; the former, however, 
took nature in the dynamic sense of  “what things might become” (natura naturans), 
whereas the latter stood on the side of nature as “things as they now are or  have become” 
(natura naturata). However, as Willey rightly remarked, it was possible to be 
“progressive” and yet to be also a “primitivist”, if the true reform one contemplated was 
one leading back to a lost paradise. Confusion would arise when reformers appealing to 
nature (whether they looked back to a blessed past or forward to a desirable future) 
regarded existing institutions as “unnatural”. The question they did not answer (nor ask) 
was: how comes nature, the very model of goodness and teacher of mankind, became so 
inefficient as to produce unnatural things? Analogously, conservatives and reactionaries 
like Burke (see below) did not answer (nor ask) the question: if nature is so generous as to 
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7. The living partnership between generations 
 
From Menenius Agrippa’s times, organic metaphors and analogies have 
played an important role in social and political thinking. In general, it can be 
said that they were instrumental in stressing the importance of the whole 
over its parts and of central government over local political bodies and 
particular interests (Coker 1910; Becker and Barnes 1961; Cohen 1993). As 
such, they seem hardly compatible with a liberal view of social life, let alone 
laissez faire ideologies.41 After the French Revolution, organismic views of 
society and the State were opposed to the contract theories which were 
thought to have inspired reformers and revolutionaries and to nourish the 
belief in universal rights. Juridical systems, class relationships and 
administrative apparatuses were said to be integral parts of the organic 
whole represented by the body of the nation living through the generations. 
Being such, they could not be manipulated at will. Any attempts to impose 
an artificial order on the organism would be arbitrary and violent; they were 
the product of intellectualistic and abstract, in a word, ‘mechanical’, 
thinking. 
The Irish politician Edmund Burke gave these ideas an ‘organic’ and 
influential form in his eloquent and highly influential attack on the 
Enlightenment and the French Revolution. He warned his readers lest they 
got “entangled in the mazes of metaphysic sophistry which urges for a 
decomposition of the whole civil and political mass for the purpose of 
originating a new civil order out of the first elements of society”. Change is 
indeed necessary for the conservation of society, but it must be achieved 
without losing “the bond of union” in “the ancient edifice”; it must not 
“dissolve the whole fabric”, but “regenerate the deficient part of the old 
constitution through the parts which were not impaired”. The English–God 
bless them– held on to these commonsensical principles even during their 
Revolution. “They kept these old parts exactly as they were, that the part 
recovered might be suited to them. They acted by the ancient organized 
states in the shape of their old organization, and not by the organic 
moleculae of a disbanded people. At no time, perhaps, did the sovereign 
legislature manifest a more tender regard to that fundamental principle of  
than at the time oft he Revolution, when it [British constitutional policy] 
                                                                                                                                                        
have produced the existing institutions over time, through conflicts and revolutions, why 
not leave her free to go on bettering them indefinitely by the same means?       
41 One major exception is represented by Herbert Spencer. On him, see Peel 1971 and La 
Vergata 1995. 
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deviated from the direct line of hereditary succession. The crown was carried 
somewhat out of the line in which it had before moved, but the new line was 
derived from the same stock. It was still a line of hereditary descent, still an 
hereditary descent in the same blood, though an hereditary descent qualified 
with Protestantism. When the legislature altered the direction, but kept the 
principle, they showed that they held it inviolable.” Burke appealed to 
common sense, empiricism, practical sense and the force of history and 
history. “The science of constructing a commonwealth, or renovating it, or 
reforming it – he said – is, like every other experimental science, not to be 
taught a priori”.  “The science of government being therefore so practical in 
itself and intended for such practical purposes—a matter which requires 
experience, and even more experience than any person can gain in his whole 
life, however sagacious and observing he may be—it is with infinite caution 
that any man ought to venture upon pulling down an edifice which has 
answered in any tolerable degree for ages the common purposes of society, or 
on building it up again without having models and patterns of approved 
utility before his eyes.” 
By what folly, then, alter “the mechanism of civil institutions” all of a 
sudden? And why talking abstractly of universal rights? “What is the use of 
discussing a man's abstract right to food or medicine? The question is upon 
the method of procuring and administering them. In that deliberation I shall 
always advise to call in the aid of the farmer and the physician rather than 
the professor of metaphysics”. Furthermore, “these metaphysic rights”, 
when they are applied to “common life”, are inevitably far from producing 
their intended effects: “the nature of man is intricate”, and “the objects of 
society are of the greatest possible complexity”. These principles, “like rays 
of light which pierce into a dense medium, are by the laws of nature refracted 
fron their straight line”; they “undergo such a variety of refractions and 
reflections that it becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the 
simplicity of their original direction”.42 Rights are not a matter of either 
                                                 
42 Here is the full passage: “These metaphysic rights entering into common life, like rays 
of light which pierce into a dense medium, are by the laws of nature refracted from their 
straight line. Indeed, in the gross and complicated mass of human passions and concerns 
the primitive rights of men undergo such a variety of refractions and reflections that it 
becomes absurd to talk of them as if they continued in the simplicity of their original 
direction. The nature of man is intricate; the objects of society are of the greatest possible 
complexity; and, therefore, no simple disposition or direction of power can be suitable 
either to man’s nature or to the quality of his affairs. When I hear the simplicity of 
contrivance aimed at and boasted of in any new political constitutions, I am at no loss to 
decide that the artificers are grossly ignorant of their trade or totally negligent of their 
duty. The simple governments are fundamentally defective, to say no worse of them. If 
you were to contemplate society in but one point of view, all these simple modes of polity 
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black or white. “The pretended rights of these theorists are all extremes; and 
in proportion as they are metaphysically true, they are morally and 
politically false. The rights of men are in a sort of middle, incapable of 
definition, but not impossible to be discerned. The rights of men in 
governments are their advantages; and these are often in balances between 
differences of good, in compromises sometimes between good and evil, and 
sometimes between evil and evil. Political reason is a computing principle: 
adding, subtracting, multiplying, and dividing, morally and not 
metaphysically or mathematically, true moral denominations.” 
Finally, abstract theorizing cannot be translated into practice unless by 
violence: “this barbarous philosophy, which is the offspring of coldhearts and 
muddy understandings, and which is as void of solid wisdom as it is destitute 
of all taste and elegance, laws are to be supported only by their own terrors 
and by the concern which each individual may find in them from his own 
private speculations or can spare to them from his own private interests. In 
the groves of their academy, at the end of every vista, you see nothing but 
the gallows. Nothing is left which engages the affections on the part of the 
commonwealth. On the principles of this mechanic philosophy, our 
institutions can never be embodied, if I may use the expression, in persons, 
so as to create in us love, veneration, admiration, or attachment”.43 
To the mechanical way of thinking and view of society, Burke opposes 
his own view of society as a permanent body composed of transient parts. 
“But one of the first and most leading principles on which the 
commonwealth and the laws are consecrated is, lest the temporary possessors 
and life-renters in it, unmindful of what they have received from their 
ancestors or of what isdue to their posterity, should act as if they were the 
entire masters, that they should not think it among their rights to cut off the 
entail or commit waste on the inheritance by destroying at their pleasure the 
whole original fabric of their society, hazarding to leave to those who come 
after them a ruin instead of an habitation — and teaching these successors as 
little to respect their contrivances as they had themselves respected the 
institutions of their forefathers. By this unprincipled facility of changing the 
state as often, and as much, and in as many ways as there are floating fancies 
or fashions, the whole chain and continuity of the commonwealth would be 
broken. No one generation could link with the other. Men would become 
                                                                                                                                                        
are infinitely captivating. In effect each would answer its single end much more perfectly 
than the more complex is able to attain all its complex purposes. But it is better that the 
whole should be imperfectly and anomalously answered than that, while some parts are 
provided for with great exactness, others might be totally neglected or perhaps materially 
injured by the over-care of a favorite member.”  
43 Burke 1826, p. 152. 
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little better than the flies of a summer […] And thus the commonwealth 
itself would, in a few generations, crumble away, be disconnected into the 
dust and powder of individuality, and at length dispersed to all the winds of 
heaven”.44 
Changes must therefore be very slow. They cannot be the work of  “an 
assembly which glories in performing in a few months the work of ages”. 
Only when “time is among the assistants” in political operations can the 
“long succession of generations” constituting the nation “be admitted into 
some share in the councils which are so deeply to affect them”. For “if justice 
requires this, the work itself requires the aid of more minds than one age can 
furnish”.45 
Burke does admit that a contract lies at the origin of society, but he 
reinterprets it in such a way as to empty it of any significance for political 
change inspired by the theory of universal rights. What derives from the 
contract, he argues, is not a “partnership” that can be altered at will by the 
contractors, but one that has a transgenerational, spiritual value, and should 
therefore be inviolable. “Society is indeed a contract. Subordinate contracts 
for objects of mere occasional interest may be dissolved at pleasure — but 
the state ought not to be considered as nothing better than a partnership 
agreement in a trade of pepper and coffee, calico, ortobacco, or some other 
such low concern, to be taken up for a little temporary interest, and to be 
dissolved by the fancy of the parties. It is to be looked on with other 
reverence, because it is not a partnership in things subservient only to the 
gross animal existence of a temporary and perishable nature. It is a 
partnership in all science; a partnership in all art; a partnership in every 
virtue and in all perfection. As the ends of such a partnership cannot be 
obtained in many generations, it becomes a partnership not only between 
those who are living, but between those who are living, those who are dead, 
and those who are to be born. Each contract of each particular state is but a 
                                                 
44 Ibid., p. 183. 
45 Here is the full passage: “A process of this kind is slow. It is not fit for an assembly 
which glories in performing in a few months the work of ages. Such a mode of reforming, 
possibly, might take up many years. Without question it might; and it ought. It is one of 
the excellences of a method in which time is amongst the assistants, that its operation is 
slow and in some cases almost imperceptible. Where the great interests of mankind are 
concerned through a long succession of generations, that succession ought to be admitted 
into some share in the councils which are so deeply to affect them. If  justice requires this, 
the work itself requires the aid of more minds than one age can furnish. It is from this 
view of things that the best legislators have been often satisfied with the establishment of 
some sure, solid, and ruling principle in government — a power like that which some of 
the philosophers have called a plastic nature; and having fixed the principle, they have 
left it afterwards to its own operation.” 
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clause in the great primeval contract of eternal society, linking the lower 
with the higher natures, connecting the visible and invisible world, according 
to a fixed compact sanctioned by the inviolable oath which holds all physical 
and all moral natures, each in their appointed place. This law is not subject 
to the will of those who by an obligation above them, and infinitely superior, 
are bound to submit their will to that law. The municipal corporations of 
thatuniversal kingdom are not morally at liberty at their pleasure, and on 
theirspeculations of a contingent improvement, wholly to separate and tear 
asunder the bands of their subordinate community and to dissolve it into an 
unsocial, uncivil, unconnected chaos of elementary principles. It is the first 
and supreme necessity only, a necessity that is not chosen but chooses, a 
necessity paramount to deliberation, that admits no discussion and demands 
no evidence,which alone can justify a resort to anarchy. This necessity is no 
exception to the rule, because this necessity itself is a part, too, of that moral 
and physical disposition of things to which man must be obedient by consent 
or force; but if that which is only submission to necessity should be made the 
object of choice, the law is broken, nature is disobeyed, and the rebellious are 
outlawed, cast forth, and exiled from this world of reason, and order, and 
peace, and virtue, and fruitful penitence, into the antagonist world of 
madness, discord, vice, confusion, and unavailing sorrow.”46 
It is interesting to note that Burke’s “partnership” was translated as 
Gemeinschaft by Friedrich von Gentz, another unremitting critic of the 
French Revolution, and a source for subsequent anti-Enlightenment German 
writers (Losurdo, 1991, p. 191). Burke’s influence on German contemporary 
and later conservative thinkers cannot be underestimated.47 And yet, his 
language was going to be spoken in France too.48 
 
 
8. Positivistic organicism  
 
Like his one-time mentor Saint-Simon, Auguste Comte wanted to “re-
organise” French (and European) society, which to his mind had been torn 
                                                 
46 Ibid., pp. 184-185. 
47 Some of them went so far as to praise him for being “more German than British” 
(Losurdo 1991, p. 191). 
48 As is well known, in 1887 the sociologist Ferdinand Tönnies introduced a famous 
distinction between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft: the former “is a living organism, 
whereas the latter should be understood as a mechanical aggregate and artifact” (Tönnies 
1935, p. 5). 
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to pieces by the Revolution and the anarchy that followed.49 A society, he 
said, is “organic” only when its components were bound into a “spontaneous 
harmony” by moral unity and a shared, coherent system of beliefs. The old 
régime was organic, but it was based on intrinsically weak, unscientific, 
beliefs. The new industrial society would combine sound, positive beliefs 
with the moral unity typical of medieval society, which Comte admired. He 
derived his concept of organic society from anti-revolutionary thinkers, and 
fellow admirers of the Middle Ages, such as de Maistre and de Bonald (Rossi 
1982, pp. 20-21). The use the latter made of the idea of organic society bears 
many analogies with the doctrines of many German jurists and political 
philosophers (see below). But Comte looked at the future more than at the 
past. He prophesized, and campaigned for, a “positive society” where 
industrialists and workers would cooperate under the guidance of scientists; 
conflicts would be solved by the common moral worship of the collective 
being, Humanity (Manuel 1962). Throughout his life He was convinced that 
in a scientifically organised society democracy was, more than dangerous, 
illusory: scientific truth, he said, is never established by casting ballots. As 
time went by, his political ideas took on an increasingly authoritarian turn . 
It is no wonder, then, that his followers, even those who criticised him on 
many points, often resorted to “organism” and the “living body” in their 
attack on the heritage of the Revolution and in their critique of democracy. 
However, as Zeev Sternhell (2006) has shown, authors such as Ernest Renan 
Renan or Hippolyte Taine were influenced by Burke as well. Renan, for 
instance, used the same imagery when he stated that inequality is sanctioned 
by both nature and tradition. “Society is a hierarchy. All individuals are 
noble and sacred, and all beings (even animals) have rights; but all of them 
are not equal, all are limbs of a great body, an immense organism that 
realizes a divine work. Denying this divine work is the fault which French 
democracy so easily incurs […] You abolish humanity if you do not grant 
that whole classes must live for the glory and pleasure of other classes […] It 
is unjust that a man should be sacrified for another man, but it is not unjust 
that all should be submitted to the higher work that realizes humanity”.50  
So did Taine: society is a “living body” shaped by countless generations 
over the course of the centuries. It is a product of history, not will. Their 
members are far from being independent from one another, and from “facing 
one another for the first time to make a contract”, for it is with their 
ancestors that they form a nation. An individual is like “a cell in an 
                                                 
49 According to Comte, the destructive forces had been first unleashed by the Protestant 
Reform, which disrupted the unity of the feudal and theocratic system. On the relations 
between Comte’s social theory and biology see Greene 1962. 
50 Renan 1869, pp. 242, 246, 248. 
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organism”, and “a cell is born, survives, develops and achieves its ends only 
by means of the health of the whole body”. Then there followed a metaphor 
that was to be caught up with, as Sternhell remarks, by Maurice Barrès and 
other French nationalists: society is a tree “whose trunk, thickened by age, 
stores in its overlapping layers, in the folds of its knots, in the tangle of its 
branches, the immemorial sediments of the pith that has nourished it, and 
the stamp of the countless seasons it has lived through”.51 
 
 
9. Neither metaphors nor models 
 
It was particularly in Germany that organismic language and analogies 
carried an anti-liberal message.52 To people such as the philosopher Johann 
Jacob Wagner and the jurists Adam Müller and Friedrich Karl von Savigny, 
phrases like ‘the living tradition of national customs’, or, to quote Coleridge 
again, “the immortal life of the nation, generation linked to generation by 
faith, freedom, heraldry, and ancestral fame”, were no mere metaphors. 
Customs and institutions were organs of a body living through history. The 
history of a nation was the life of a nation. And it was unique, as Herder had 
eloquently argued in his criticism of the abstract, rationalistic universalism 
of the Enlightenment: like all living things, cultures undergo an organic 
development. It was only too natural for other voices to adopt his views 
after the Revolution and Napoleon had shown the Germans the 
consequences of imposing alien principles upon a people in the name of 
universal Man. To mention only one of them, the physician, philosopher, 
religious and political thinker Franz von Baader advocated “dynamical” as 
opposed to “mechanical” philosophy (1809), and contrasted artificial, 
disruptive and regressive movement (Revolution) with the peaceful, orderly, 
steady, forward movement of society, which he called “Evolution” 
(Evolution). The latter was based on an inner drive, as in plants and animals 
developing from a seed or germ. The former was not a sudden acceleration of 
growth but a merely negative process. Revolutionismus was a negation of the 
                                                 
51 Quoted by Sternhell 2007, p. 300 (Italian translation of Sterhell 2006). 
52 Although this message was not necessarily a reactionary one. While stressing that “a 
neo-conservative reinterpretation of the concept of organism is characteristic of Late 
Romanticism”, Sturma (2008, p. 232) rightly points out that even the “retrospective 
view” of authors (like Müller, Friedrich Schlegel and Baader) idealizing the Christian 
Middle Ages “was still directed forward”. He concludes: “When the politics of Late 
Romanticism follows revisionary goals it can be described as revolutionary 
conservatism”.    
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laws of life, including social life, whereas Evolutionismus pointed out the 
right approach to politics (1834).53 
Before going on, it is important to make some points: 
1) Even when we are not in presence of fully articulated social or 
political theories, we must pay attention to general assumptions and images 
conditioning and channeling reflections on society and politics.   
2) The recurrent appeal to tradition makes it evident that “organic” 
shaded into “historical” (and vice versa). No wonder that Coleridge and other 
advocates of the “German-Coleridgean doctrine” (J.S. Mill’s definition) 
lamented modern man’s loss of  “the true historical feeling” and the 
consequent replacement of historical privileges with universal rights.  
3) “Organic” did not mean “biological” in today’s sense, but “living” 
because “spiritually (or culturally) coherent” and “hierarchically organised”. 
With this in mind, it can be said that “organic” and “living” were used in a 
literal, and metaphysical,  rather than metaphorical sense.54  
4) In an organic society, spiritual values predominate over material and 
economic ones. Tensions between labourers and employers are solved 
                                                 
53 Baader 1831, 1834. It should be remembered that throughout the 18th and until well 
into the 19th century the term ‘evolution’ meant what would later (after the early 1860s) 
be called ‘ontogeny’ or ‘embryological development’. It had been used by supporters of 
preformationist against epigenetic theories of generation. Therefore it inevitably 
conveyed the idea of an orderly and progressive process leading through gradual 
differentiation to the full maturity of a living thing. Significantly, Spencer used the word 
‘progress’ to refer to both biological and social development in his early writings on these 
matters, although he rejected preformation: in his jargon, “the development of every 
organism is a passage from the homogeneous to the heterogeneous”. He later used, and 
popularized, ‘evolution’ in the same meaning in which he had used ‘progress’. His 1857 
statement “Progress is the law of all development” was translated into “there are not 
several kinds of Evolution, but one Evolution going on everywhere after the same 
manner” (see La Vergata 1995).  
54 Such organicism must therefore not be confused with the use of social metaphors in 
biological theorizing by scientists like Claude Bernard, Rudolf Virchow, Oskar Hertwig, 
Charles Otis Whitman  and William Morton Wheeler: see Schiller 1978, Mazzolini 1983, 
Weindling 1981, 1982, Mitman 1992, and the essays in Maasen et al. eds. 1995 (especially 
Mitman 1995 and Mitchell 1995). A fortiori it would be wrong to say that the authors we 
are dealing with here were borrowing models from the biological sciences. A model is an 
intellectual construct that is consciously articulated and employed for a heuristic purpose. 
Our authors were a far cry from this: their language was suggestive, not scientific in the 
modern sense; nor did they want it to be scientific. It must not be forgotten, however, 
that many German scientists set themselves a sort of duty of writing on bio-social matters 
in the spirit of their country’s typical Staatsbiologie tradition. The zoologist and holistic 
philosopher of biology Jacob von Uexküll’s Staatsbiologie (1920) represents one of the 
latest contribution to this tradition (Harrington 1996, Merker 2011).      
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through cooperation, subordination of individual interests to those of the 
whole, respect for hierarchy, sense of duty. 
5) The State was not to be construed as an association based on utility, 
but as having a higher (often divine) purpose, embodied in an idea or 
unifying principle.  
 
      
10. Organicism and the Volk 
 
Since the wars against Napoleon, in Germany there had been forming a 
notion that was later to play a crucial (and sinister) role. For the present 
purposes, we may consider it enough to define the  Volk as an organic 
communion of people, tradition and nature. In the German tradition, which 
was extolled by the Volk ideologists, the craftsman and the peasant were 
intimately bound to nature; it was however not nature in general, but nature 
as ‘native soil’ and ‘landscape’”, that is nature transformed by the local 
community, i.e. the Gemeinde. The Gemeinde’s interaction with nature was 
an essential part of  its life through time, that is its tradition. It was, to be 
sure, an economic community too, but above all it embodied aesthetic, moral 
and spiritual values, which took on specific forms in different conditions. The 
members of the community delighted in nature because they were imbued 
with a sense of belonging to, and the pride of being part of, a natural and 
social whole. Both the community and its landscape were pervaded by the 
same vital energy, a spiritual force that could not be understood in 
mechanical and utilitarian terms. Nature was enjoyed and used by the 
community in a respectful and creative way. The problem of putting limits 
to its exploitation–a problem raised dramatically by the new urban and 
industrial centres–simply did not exist. No wonder Volk ideology was 
intrinsically anti-urban and anti-industrial. In big cities economic 
relationships dominated over, and tended to replace, spiritual relationships; 
industry destroyed the material and moral landscape shaped by generations. 
The big city was anti-nature and anti-soul. The passage from agricultural to 
industrial society was also disruptive of the race: not only did it worsen the 
quality of air and food, and favoured bad moral behaviours and habits, it 
also entailed a loss of the sense of national identity. Cosmopolitanism was 
non-natural and immoral: real values were rooted in “blood and soil”.55 
                                                 
55 The typical representative of cosmopolitanism was the Jew. Being a déraciné, the Jew 
was the opposite of the German peasant and craftsman. Scattered all over the world, the 
Jewish nation was kept together by an artificial consensus that was quite different from 
the organic bond of the Gemeinde. In many ways, the Jews were the embodiment of all 
that went against natural and spiritual values. No wonder that Hitler referred to them as 
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Needless to say, terms like ‘blood’ and ‘soil’ were used to describe 
historical, spiritual and moral bonds because they were deprived of any 
specifically biological meaning. They were de-materialized, shrouded in a 
mythical fog and transformed into shibboleths.56 The same happened with 
‘destiny’ and ‘soul’. As Fritz Stern (1960) and George Mosse (1964) have 
documented, in the writings of Julius Langbehn, Lagarde, Guido von List, 
Alfred Schüler and self-styled “neo-Romantics” such as Eugen Diederichs, 
völkisch ideology often shaded into sheer mysticism, even occultism. Seeing 
‘through one’s soul’ was said to be superior to knowing through science. 
Science was rejected as superficial, in that it did not put man in contact with 
the stream of non-material cosmic forces that were the essence of nature. 
Only intuitive insight into the life forces enabled man to recover spiritual 
health and energy in the midst of corrupt modernity. Hearing the voice of 
nature and feeling at one with its mystery and eternal flow was easier for 
those who lived closest to nature: the Aryans as a race, and the peasants as a 
class. The laboratory and the town were not nature. The Volk would never 
degenerate if it kept true to its blood and soil. People should either return to 
land or re-create an environment where a natural way of life, according to 
sound traditions, would alleviate social tensions and reinvigorate the race 
both physically and morally.57    
                                                                                                                                                        
“the typical people that needs no vital space” (the Germans being, on the contrary, the 
people that needed an expanding Lebensraum), and an anti-nature force. On the relations 
of Volk ideologies and German political thinking see Merker 2001.  
56 Mythological racism must not be conflated with biological racism, although the two 
often merged into one another, and in the same person. By pretending to be ‘scientific’, 
that is based on purportedly biological ‘data’ and concepts, the  first  took side within 
what was thought to be modern science (whatever its social implications or 
consequences), something irrationalist thinkers and enemies of science could not accept, 
nor took pain to understand. Most German doctors and biologists did eventually 
collaborate actively with the Nazi regime, but it is misleading to subsume Nazi racism 
under the category of social Darwinism, as it is commonly done. Mythologists and völkisch 
ideologists were against science as such, especially if it seemed imbued with the English 
utilitarian and mechanistic spirit. The specifically Darwinian explanation of evolution did 
not fare well in Germany between the two wars: see La Vergata 1996. 
57 Movements flourished which encouraged life according to nature, that is “blood and 
soil”. Plans were also devised for establishing utopian Germanic settlements in virgin 
environments (in Germany and abroad): naturalist communities, garden-cities, 
associations which practised the cult of the body (gymnastics in the open air and 
excursions would bring out real man out of the artificial creature of modern materialist 
civilization), country boarding schools where character could be formed not through 
bookish education but by full immersion into the regenerating forces of agricultural and 
rural life. As the founder of the country boarding schools (Landerziehungsheime) 
movement, Hermann Lietz, said in 1934, “an organic education was that which was in 
tune with nature”. Theodor Fritsch, author of Stadt der Zukunft (1896), proposed the 
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Through their inner eye, individuals would also see themselves as living 
elements of an intergenerational community, that is of a spiritual whole 
requiring them to fulfil their duty towards the tradition that gave him his 
very life. Patriotism took on an inevitably racist tone (not to mention that 
there were more chances of dangerous miscegenation with non-German 
elements in hectic, effete and corrupted big towns).  This was racism dressed 
in idealist clothing. The obsessive appeal to ideal values was a key feature of 
German anti-modernism.58 And idealism,59 for which the Germans – the 
people of Innerlichkeit – thought they had a special bent, was the distinctive 
trait of their Kultur, as opposed to foreign Zivilisation. 
 
 
11. Kultur vs Zivilisation       
 
Kultur consisted of spiritual values embodied in the living organism of 
tradition and lying beyond the reach of  rational understanding. That was 
why ‘life’, ‘blood’, ‘soul’, ‘race’, ‘will’, ‘duty’ were not concepts that could be 
explained rationally, but active forces operating through nature and time. In 
his Gedanken im Krieg (1914), Thomas Mann wrote that Kultur, is the result 
of “the taming and trasfiguration of a deep, dark, warm world”, the 
sublimation of the “demonic” which manifests itself in the “fundamental 
forces of life” such as art and war. By Zivilisation Mann meant “reason, 
softness, respectability, scepticism, decomposition ─ Geist (Spirit, here 
opposed to Seele, ‘soul’)”. Geist meant “civil, bourgeois: it is the sworn enemy 
of instinct, of passions, it is anti-demonic, anti-heroic”…60 A host of other 
authors added to the blacklist terms like utilitarianism, hedonism, 
materialism, optimism, the superficial belief in progress, intellectualism, the 
quantitative spirit pervading science, individualism, democracy, 
                                                                                                                                                        
creation of garden-cities, where life could be  closer to nature, as remedies to urbanism 
and industrialisation. Willibald Hentschel promoted the countryside Mittgart settlement, 
where the race would be brought back to its roots in the landscape of the fatherland, 
preserved from the deleterious influence of modernity, and liberated from the danger of 
mixing with inferior elements; the latter were to be left in, or sent back to, the towns, 
where the harmful environment would dispose of them. While purification was to be 
achieved through country life, the town was a  place of punishment for the misfit. 
58 It was also a key feature of Nazi literature: suffice it to skim through Hitler’s Mein 
Kampf. 
59 Stern (1960) coined the term Vurgäridealismus to describe the abuse of the word in 
writings that claimed to be politically neutral but in fact valued obedience and authority 
above anything else. 
60 Mann 1986, passim. Mann expanded on this at unbelievable length in his infamous, and 
wearisome, Betrachtungen eines Unpolitischen (1918).  
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industrialism, commercialism, mass consumerism, urbanism, pacifism, 
antipatriotism, antimilitarism, parliamentarism, political tinkering (as 
opposed to grand statesmanship), moral indifference, the bourgeois desire for 
security, and the predominance of the prosaic In a word, these authors added 
everything that originated in the West (i.e. France and Britain, and later the 
USA), was alien to the German spirit and could only be imposed on Germans 
‘mechanically’, for it could never be assimilated ‘organically’.  
Inevitably, the contrast between Kultur and Zivilisation reached its 
acme with the outbreak of the Great War. German intellectuals poured down 
an immense quantity of books, articles, pamphlets and appeals defending the 
right of their country to fight in defense of its Kultur against what they 
unanimously described as an aggression on it. Mann stated with pride that 
German militarism  went hand in hand with German idealism. References to 
‘organic community’ and attacks on the ‘mechanical worldview’ abounded in 
wartime  publications. Replacing France as the arch-enemy and the 
representative of Zivilisation, Britain was pointed out as the main 
responsible for the conflict, and was charged with embodying everything 
that was alien and opposed to German ideals and values.61 The war was 
generally presented as an ‘either you or me’ fight to death between two 
incommensurable Weltanschauungen. Britain had been rotted away by 
parliamentarism and had become a commercial nation ruled by a culture-
hating plutocracy. Its politics was aggressive, hypocritical and crassly 
cunning. The “renegade” Houston Stewart Chamberlain wrote that the way 
of life of the Briton, was typical of a “nation of sheep”, all comforming to the 
fad of the moment, and showing in all its aspects “the same pattern 
everywhere”, as was to be expected in a country degenerated into a 
mechanical and materialist civilisation.62 Britons were all “men of 
commerce” (Geschäftsmänner) in spirit, when not in deeds.63 They still relied 
on the old Anglo-Saxon ideal of the strong “individual personality” 
(Einzelmensch), thus representing a type of humanity unable to adapt to the 
modern development of the human Geist; the Germans, conversely, 
represented a higher form of culture, based on the “organised community, 
which […] combines both the freedom of its individual parts and the unity of 
the whole” in every aspect of life, in the army as well as in industry. That 
was why the Germans were “able to achieve a humane restructuring of the 
world (eine liebevolle Weltgestaltung) by way of the organised community and 
                                                 
61 The word “Anglophobia” has been used by Stibbe (2001) to describe the attitude of 
almost all German intellectuals. 
62 Chamberlain, Ravings…, 1916, pp. 53, 113-115. 
63 The historian Hans Delbrück in 1914, quoted by Stibbe 2001, p. 60. 
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in line with the historical development of the eternal ideal”.64 According to 
the historian Friedrich Meinecke, the Germans “had a mission from God to 
organise the divine essence of man in a separate, unique, irreplaceable form. 
[…] Through its achievements for the spirit of mankind a nation justifies all 
its selfish aspirations and thereby its power struggles and wars”. The unique 
spiritual character of the Germans consisted of a combination of 
Innerlichkeit, individual freedom and willingness to sacrifice one’s own 
interests to the benefit of the whole. Western countries, by contrast, were 
characterised by a “uniform, mechanical” type of humanity, degenerate 
individualism and unbridled selfishness.65  
The philosopher Max Scheler joined the fray with his massive Genius des 
Krieges und der deutsche Krieg (1915). He saw evidence of “cant”, by which 
he meant a hypocritical language of self-interest, in all that was British. The 
British said “thinking” but what they really meant was “calculating” 
(rechnen). They confused civilization and culture with mere “comfort”.They 
could not understand the true function of war in the life of the State. Scheler 
also attacked Darwinism as an expression of the British materialist and 
mechanistic mentality and competitive ethos, which prevented even as 
honest and good-natured scientist as Darwin from going beyond a merely 
superficial understanding of life and evolution. Opposition to Darwinism in 
the name of some form of vitalism or idealism or teleology was not quite rare 
among German biologists and philosophers at the time, and was to become 
stronger later on.66       
The antithesis between ‘mechanical’ Britain and ‘organic’ Germany was 
perhaps nowhere more radical than in the sociologist Werner Sombart’s 
infamous Händler und Helden (1915). In an article that appeared in the 
Berliner Tageblatt on November, 2nd 1914, Sombart candidly but proudly 
avowed that “the spontaneous and elementary hatred against England is 
anchored in the deepest core of our being, there where ‘rational 
considerations’ no longer exist, where the ‘irrational’, the instinctive, has sole 
jurisdiction. We hate in the English a principle which is alien to our 
innermost and highest being”.67 Not realizing that such a statement 
preempted any attempts at motivating in writing his, and his fellow 
countrymen’s, struggle with Britain, Sombart launched out into a 
repetitious, obsessive contrast between two worldviews, indeed between two 
spiritual categories. Long quotations would spare us any comment, but to 
                                                 
64 The economist and Reichstag deputy Gerhard von Schulze-Gaevernitz, quoted by 
Stibbe 2001, pp. 62-63.  
65 Meinecke 1915, p. 51. 
66 See Harrington 1996. 
67 Quoted by Stibbe 2001, p. 12. 
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prevent the reader from getting bored I have confined them to an Appendix. 
Here it will suffice to say that Sombart made it clear that ‘organic’ had by 
then virtually severed any links with biology, and had come to mean 
‘spiritually harmonious’ or ‘imbued with idealism’. Needless to say, Sombart 
characterised the “British worldwide Empire” as a “commercial firm” devoid 
of, and inimical to, any moral value.   
Finally, it was during the war that Oswald Spengler’s enormously 
successful Untergang des Abendlandes (1918-1922) cultures were described as 
incommensurable and mutually exclusive wholes, as organisms mysteriously 
born of nature’s unfathomable womb and returning to it as mysteriously 
after growing, reaching maturity, flourishing, decaying and dying. As it 
became clearer after the war,  Spengler opposed both liberalism and Marxist 
socialism, which he charged with the usual list of faults, including the 
obvious one: being “mechanical”. His hopes for an organic society lay in 
“Prussian socialism”, by which he meant a confused mixture of aristocracy, 
hierarchy, medieval chivalry, German Kultur, Innerlichkeit, order and 
authoritarianism (he admired Mussolini more than Hitler).68 
The opposition to modernity was a Leitmotiv in what has come to be 
known as the “conservative revolution” of the Weimar years. Its exponents 
described themselves as basically “against”: against liberalism, 
parliamentarism, capitalism (but also communism), individualism (but also 
collectivism). They enjoyed antitheses, which are a boon for historians. 
Below is a list of some of those contained in the writings of one of  the most 
representative authors of the movement, Moeller van den Bruck, especially 
in his Das dritte Reich (1923). The good things are, needless to say, on the 
right: 
 
industrial society                                  [authority of the] totaler Staat 
particularism                                        the Whole 
individual                                             community  
progress                                                growth 
modernity                                             timeless values 
rationalism                                   
 inner bond of a living and 
indestructible order 
 
“Growth”, it will be noted, is more ‘organic’ than progress. 
                                                 
68 O. Spengler, Preußentum und Sozialismus, Munich, 1920. Sternhell (2006; It. transl., pp. 
511-512) pointed out interesting similarities between Spengler’s view of cultures and that 
of the panslavic Russian philosopher and social writer N.J. Danilevski (1822-1885).   
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And here is a second list, based on ‘Deutschland und die konservative 
Revolution’ (1932),69 written by Edgar Jung, who was a member of Moeller’s 
circle and Reichkanzler von Papen’s counsellor and ghost writer: 
 
temporality                                                              eternity 
party politics                                                               ideals of Western man 
equality                                                                    inner worth 
social and political principles (Gesinnung)              organic growth of the  
                                                                                  leader (Führer) 
bureaucratic obligation                                              personal responsibility 
mass happiness                                                       Volk identity 
                                                                                 (Volkspersönlichkeit) 
“logocentric” frame of mind (Einstellung)              biocentric frame of 
                                                                                 mind 
 
As Peter Gay (1992, p. 80) shrewdly remarked, the Nazi were to show 
what a keen sense they had of “the kind of wholeness most Germans were 
looking for” by preferring to call themselves not a party but a “movement” 
(Bewegung): “It sounded more organic”, he  commented.  
 
 
12. Machines get a soul 
 
Conservative revolutionists did not like science and technology more than 
völkisch ideologists did.  Being the most visible aspect of modernity, 
technology remained under concentric fire from the neo-Romantics, 
expressionists (like Toller and Kaiser), Lebensphilosophen (like Klages and 
Scheler), irrationalist opponents of positivism and scientism, and left-wing 
critics of reification (including members of the Frankfurt school). The debate 
on technology reached its apex in the Streit um die Technik in the 1920s. On 
the one hand, (neo)positivists and theorists of industrial society believed that 
                                                 
69 Jung (1932, p. 380) defined the conservative revolution as “the putting again in the 
foreground (Wiederinachtsetzung) of all those elementary laws and values without which 
man loses his bond with Nature and God, and no real order can be built”. In Die 
Herrschaft der Minderwertigen. Ihr Zerfall und ihre Ablösung (1927) Jung, who was later a 
collaborator of Goebbels’, championed a corporate elite State modelled after the Medieval 
Reich (Leipzig, 1927). Note the use of the word ‘minderwertige’ (the inferior), of sinister 
fame. On Jung see Jones 1988. In his essay on Freud (1929), Thomas Mann, who did 
sympathise with the conservative revolution until the assassination of Walter Rathenau  
in 1922, defined it retrospectively (and from the vantage point of the repentant) as “an 
attempt to politicise the irrational leanings of the recent thinking on life 
(Lebensforschung), to translate it into a crude reaction in a revolutionary light.”  
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technology was a positive force in the rationalization of society because it 
helped create a neutral ground in which conflict and struggle would be 
attenuated. On the other hand, there were those who equated technological 
advance with the domination of the spiritless over the spiritual, or of means 
over ends.70 Technology was also seen as a symbol, or a cause, of capitalism, 
Fordism, mass production and consumption, Amerikanismus. It conquered 
the world by dehumanizing it. It was the enemy of life. In the words of the 
self-styled “national bolshevik” journalist Ernst Niekisch, technology was 
“men-eating”. The words he used to describe the “anti-life, demonic 
character” of technology are self-explanatory: “Technology is the rape of 
nature. It brushes nature aside […] When technology triumphs, nature is 
violated and desolated. Technology murders life by striking down, step by 
step, the limits established by nature. It devours men and all that is 
human.”71 
 
 
        
  
13. Conclusion 
 
The Great War put paid to many of the aberrations sponsored by the 
intellectuals who rushed enthusiastically to it through the most decisive of 
arguments, i.e. mass death. It did not put an end to the German mistrust 
towards Zivilisation. Far from this, it fuelled resentment and further 
strengthened the myth of German uniqueness. The war had been lost, and 
Spengler voiced a widespread complaint when he said that the persisting 
hostility of ‘Romantics’ to modern technology had prevented the country 
from fully deploying its military potential. This was one of many variations 
on the “stab in the back” theme. Now the spirit of revanche obliged Kultur to 
come to terms with technology, if Germany was to claim the leading position 
it was entitled to in the world. Re-armament, after all, could not be left to 
                                                 
70 For instance, as early as 1900 the philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel had 
expressed his fear that technical development “might turn the apparatus into a self-
sufficing being”; “a slave revolt of the means against the ends” would ensue, “the slave 
(the means) becoming the master of its master (man)” (Simmel 1900, pp. 521-522). 
Herman Hesse would translate this fear into a vivid vision of a struggle between men and 
machines in his The Steppenwolf  (1927). We are all familiar with many later artistic 
representations of analogous scenes, including the famous revolt of the computer in 
Stanley Kubrick’s 2001: a Space Odissey (1968), inspired by Arthur C. Clarke’s The 
Sentinel (1948). Clarke collaborated to the script, and later wrote the novel 2001 to clear 
the doubts left by the film. 
71 ‘Menschefresser Technik’, Widerstand, 6, 1931, p. 110; quoted in Herf 1987, p. 39. 
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industrialists and politicians only. Patriotic intellectuals had to roll up their 
sleeves and adjust themselves to a new task. Fortunately, many of them 
have always shown a remarkable ability to change their minds according to 
the circumstances. And many of them answered the Volk’s summons. During 
the extraordinary and tragic years of the Weimar Republic, they set 
themselves to work in order to redeem technology by conferring the dignity 
of Kultur upon it. As a result, in the 1920s and 1930s many German 
intellectuals were able to reconcile their hostility to industrial society with a 
fascination for technological achievements. In what Jeffrey Herf aptly called 
“reactionary modernism”, technology was made compatible with the 
German revolt against Western capitalism, liberalism and scientific 
positivism. In other words, technology could be legitimised without the 
German soul succumbing to Enlightenment rationality; it could be rescued 
from Zivilisation and made a part of Kultur. The new view of technology was 
couched in the very language of instinct, blood, organism, nation, soil, will, 
duty, life (and ‘idealism’, for that matter) that had been used by Volk 
ideologists to oppose it.72 Among those who endeavoured to reconcile 
technology with Kultur were some of the authors that had presented the war 
as one against Zivilisation. The most comprehensive attempt was made by 
Ernst Jünger, and it would deserve a discussion of its own. Spengler, too, 
played his part, especially in his famous Munich paper Der Mensch und die 
Technik (published in 1931). There he argued that technology was a product 
of the very “Faustian” spirit which manifested itself in the highest 
achievements of Kultur.73 The jurist Carl Schmitt went even so far as to poke 
fun at the Romantic opposition of organic and mechanical.74 
                                                 
72 Herf 1987 examines not only intellectuals such as Spengler, Sombart, Niekisch, Jünger, 
Schmitt, but also the writings of engineers and other ‘mechanics’. See also Losurdo 1991, 
pp. 112-118.  
73 La Vergata 2002. It was a somewhat different Spengler from the one who, in a letter 
dated 25th October 1914 (quoted in Stibbe 2001, p. 71), had expressed his fears that “in 
the Germany which made its world position secure through technical skill, money and an 
eye for facts, a completely soulless Americanism will rule, and will dissolve art, the 
nobility, the Church, and world outlook in a materialism such as only once has been seen 
– in Rome at the time of the First Empire.” It should not be forgotten that by 
Zivilisation Spengler meant, in the Untergang and afterwards, not something alien and 
opposed to Kultur, but the last and declining phase of Kultur: Zivilisation was, to be sure, 
increasingly mechanical and dead-oriented for Spengler, too, but it was so because it was 
the dying echo of a former flourishing life.  
74 Schmitt, Politische Romantik (1919), quoted by Losurdo 1991, p. 113. Like Spengler, 
Schmitt had spoken differently at the beginning of the war: in 1914, he had declared it 
was time to reckon with the “spirit of the time”, that is “the age of the machine and 
organization, the mechanistic age”, the age “of the most generalized calculability (der 
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The alliance between bombers and philosophers, between Krupp and 
Kultur, eventually led Germany to an even greater disaster. This is another 
story, and historians are still debating whether that of Germany was a 
Sonderweg doomed from the beginning or something the Germans shared, 
although in uniquely tragic proportions, with the Western world that so 
many of them despised. Whatever the case, the lesson taught by reactionary 
modernism should be kept before us whenever we discuss technology. For it 
teaches that the same intellectual tools and strategies can be used now to 
accuse, now to excuse technology. To make things more complicated, most of 
us are today in a situation not unlike that of  ‘neo-Romantic’ German 
intellectuals. We enjoy, we actually strive for, technological commodities 
and gadgets, while at the same time nourishing, in some hidden part of our 
souls, a dislike for the way of thinking technology implies. We pay lip-service 
to appeals to protect nature from industrial greed, and we go back to playing 
with our new-model mobile cell phone. We, humanists, feel superior to mere 
‘technicians’, but we resort to them to take care of our air-conditioning 
devices. We are swinging, as it were, between two soft forms of opposed 
fundamentalisms. This state of mind may be deemed ‘romantic’, hypocritical 
or schizophrenic, but it deserves to be analyzed in depth. History, as I said at 
the beginning, has more than a word to say with respect to this task.  
According to Zeev Sternhell, “organicism, a supreme form of 
subordination of the individual to collectivity, is one of the major ‘mother-
ideas’ in the thought of anti-Enlightenment thinkers”.75 It can reasonably be 
added that not only right-wing thinking, but communist totalitarianism, 
too, is liable to this charge. Now, the Soviet Union was far from an anti-
technological country; it spoiled the environment and destroyed nature as 
much as rugged capitalism did. There seems to be no necessary connection 
between subordination of the individual to collectivity and the rejection of 
technology. Likewise, not all forms of campaigning for the protection of 
nature from technology  are ‘conservative’ and ‘reactionary’ per se, although 
they imply some form of limitation ‘from above’ of the inviduals’ freedom to 
carry their happiness their way. In such matters, virtue hardly boils down to 
having a look at the bad and then do the opposite. It is possible to be in the 
right and in a bad company. Nobody, I hope, would rush for a cigarette on 
his/her learning that Hitler declared war on smoking, nor would one hold 
pollution sacred because the Nazis launched a programme of nature 
protection. However, a sober attitude towards ‘nature vs. technology’ issues 
requires acnowledging that traces of organicism still live on in, or rather 
                                                                                                                                                        
allgemeinste Berechenbarkeit) (Der Wert des Staates und die Bedeutung des Einzelnen, quoted 
ibid., p. 212).     
75 Sternhell 2006; I am quoting from p. 299 of the Italian translation (2007).  
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behind, some strands of present-day environmentalism, which is so large and 
supra-national a movement that it can host people of the most diverse 
political leanings. Whenever such issues are discussed, it would be good 
practice to ask if the arguments that are being used–regardless of whether for 
or against–carry with them unconscious assumptions and emotional 
implications characteristic of the context in which they originated; in other 
words, we should ask if these arguments, as it were, bear the indelible stamp 
of the womb which generated them. And here is where history, or, better, 
historical sense and sensitivity come in. The only firm conclusion I have 
come to is that we should give up discussing vital issues in universal terms, 
or, as 17th-century natural theologians used to say, “from a higher point of 
view”.  
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Appendix 
 
Selected passages from Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden. Patriotische 
Besinnungen, München, Duncker & Humblot, 1915. Translation is mine. 
  
There is nothing in history that can be compared to the English State, 
except, perhaps, the ancient merchant States of the Phoenicians and 
Carthaginians. However, a “worldwide empire” born of a purely commercial 
spirit has never been seen before. The uniqueness of the English State lies in 
that it embodies none of the right ideas about the State that have been 
worked out so far, namely that it is an organically articulated human 
community, unitary from the point of view of both cultural and civil life, to 
which colonies, as far as I see it, belong in full right, as its external 
realizations. 
Everything we have learned so far from great States has been generated 
organically from vital impulses. But the universal English empire has grown 
mechanically, piece by piece, like an invested capital: its individual 
components are ‘accumulated’ and joined to the mother country by a very 
tenuous link. […] In what sense does India, a country of 300 million 
inhabitants, ‘belong’ to Great Britain? This ‘belonging’ has a meaning only if 
the whole worldwide English empire is understood in a commercial sense, 
that is if it is conceived not as a State but as a vast mercantile firm, with the 
mother country as its headquarters, where the money and the administration 
are kept, and the colonies as its local agencies. 
That England, as a country, was formed in a completely inorganic way is 
shown by a look at statistics. A State whose citizens are not, for the most 
part, employed in agriculture is manifestly, as it were, a malformation. Now, 
in England those active in agriculture (and, interestingly, in fishing) have 
decreased to a mere 8% (!), i.e. one twelfth of the population. Against this 
background, one fourth of the population is represented by traders and 
people employed in communications, and nearly one half (45%) by those 
working in industry. Such a State is a caricature, it is no longer a living unit, 
but a commercial business. (pp. 35-37) 
[…] 
The mercantile spirit is essentially destructive: it is a purely mechanical 
idea of all that pertains to the State. It purports to maintain the balance of 
‘forces’. But only dead things can be ‘weighed’, not living beings, which is 
what States really are. Adam Müller poured his contempt on the ‘miserable 
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image of the balancing scales’, as if ‘the right of the peoples were nothing but 
the result of a political arithmetic’. (pp. 39-40) 
[…] 
The statement that ‘all power comes from God’ is not the historical 
reason behind the bourgeois constitution, but an idea [in Kant’s sense], a 
practical principle of reason, and something more. Its spirit has nothing to 
do  with the mechanistic, materialistic and individualistic theories of the 
State of Western Europe.  
[…] 
The essence of the German idea of the State must be defined as objective 
and organic, as it is clearly rooted in the fundamental view that the State in 
not based on, or constituted by, individuals, it is not an assemblage of 
individuals, and it does not have the purpose of promoting the particular 
interests of the individuals. 
If anything, the State is the community of the people (Volkgemeinschaft) 
forming a unity. It is the conscious organisation of a supra-individual entity, 
to which the individuals belong as its parts. Having come to recognise the 
supra-individual existence and the power of the community of the people, 
the heroic worldview must inevitably attain to this idea of the State. For 
only in the unity of the State could the living whole made up of people come 
to an awareness of itself and make its own essence concrete. 
Opponents of this German idea of the State often attempt to diminish its 
value by branding it ‘reactionary’ and by contrasting it to the ‘progressive’ 
theory of the State, which is peculiar to the English shopkeeper’s spirit. Let 
me recall once again the words used by [the socialist] Ferdinand Lassalle to 
explain his view of the essence of the State, which was based on the theory of 
his teacher Fichte: “The State is the unity of individuals in an ethical whole, 
a unity that increases by millions of times the forces of all individuals 
included in it […]. The purpose of the State is, therefore, to bring the essence 
of man to its full unfolding; in other words, to shape the destiny of man–that 
is, the civilization of which mankind is capable–to real existence. The final 
goal is the education of mankind, and its development towards freedom. This 
is the proper ethical nature of the State, its true and supreme duty”. 
‘Development towards freedom’: this is what Fichte meant when he 
spoke of the individual’s freedom  to give himself a form by which to reach 
his ethical perfection, a perfection he, as an ideal being, possesses a priori. It 
means to become, by approximating to the idea, what one really is in the 
ideal. 
“Sirs, however great are the differences that can separate us [socialists] 
from you–so Lassalle addresses his judges when concluding his famous 
speech before the King’s Supreme Court–we [socialists] both oppose, side by 
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side, the disintegration of all that is moral! I defend, like you, the ancient 
Vesta’s fire burning in every civilizations, the State, against modern 
barbarians (the Manchestertum)!”. 
The view according to which individuals have first of all duties towards 
the whole, and that rights can be granted to them only to the extent that 
thay perform their duties, is inseparable from this idea of the State. This idea 
rejects the abstract, the merely quantitative levelling of individuals, and it 
sets itself the ideal of enabling each of them, according to their abilities and 
performances, to reach the full development of their essence in a way that is 
profitable for the success of the whole. 
This view is called ‘organic’ not because–as most people think–it 
compares the State to an organism in a biological sense. (This comparison 
should be abandoned, or used with great caution. It easily leads to mistakes, 
as whenever it is used in a theory of the State, it is associated with the 
objective and organic, and specifically German, idea of the State, which 
cannot be admitted. So was Hobbes’ theory of the State born of the English, 
not the German, spirit). This view is defined ‘organic’, and rightly so, 
because it is opposed to the English mechanistic concept, and because the 
individual’s relation to the whole is seen as organic in the sense that 
individuals must integrate ‘organically’, that is spiritually, into the spiritual 
whole. 
If you like, we have here, too, an analogy with the biological organism, 
but in an altogether different sense. Naturally, also the State is a living 
being, but a meta-biological, a spiritual living being, in which the individuals 
participate by their spiritual life. (pp. 73-78) 
[…] 
Now, nature is incessantly urging every State to affirm itself as a living 
being, to confront and measure  against other States. It is proper to any 
living being to extend its activity: in every State there lives ‘an inner drive 
the present generation is unaware of, but which derives from that of past 
generations, to its vital growth’, as Adam Müller, once again, put it most 
aptly. 
There is a ‘vital growth’ in the organic State only: no expansive 
tendency dominates over it that is non-vital, founded on merely commercial 
reasons–as it was the case with the mechanically assembled English Empire. 
All forces, all organs, all limbs of the State must keep together in a 
harmonious relation: this view represents a constitutive element of what we 
have learned here to recognise as an objective, organic, in a word German, 
idea of the State. 
The idea of the autonomous organic life of every State has replaced the 
shopkeeper’s view of a mutual, non-vital balance between individual States. 
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It is an idea that contains all guiding principles for a healthy State politics. 
[…] 
The struggle between States, that is the war between peoples, is a 
phenomenon that necessarily accompanies the life of a State. For it is an 
aspect of life itself. The justification of war lies, therefore, in the natural 
condition of the whole living world, to which the States necessary belong: 
‘quella guerra è giusta, che è necessaria’76, said the man who should teach 
history to a world of merchants. The opposition between merchants and 
heroes amounts to the opposition between shopkeepers and warriors, 
between whom we are called upon to choose. (pp. 79-81) 
 
                                                 
76 Original text in Italian: “That war is just which is necessary”. 
